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State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
S U P R E M E COURT

OCTOBER T E R M , A . D .

1934

In re Opinion to the Governor
Re Constitutional Convention
BRIEF SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL AS AMICI CURIAE
BY LEAVE O F C O U R T IN OPPOSITION TO THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY O F THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND T O CALL A CONVENTION T O REVISE OR
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION O F THE STATE

On J a n u a r y 24, 1935, under the authority of Article 10,
Section 3, of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island,
the Governor of the State of Rhode Island requested the
judges of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to give their
written opinion upon the following questions:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power
if the General Assembly should provide by law
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the State;
" ( b ) that the Governor shall call for the election, at
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such number and manner as the General Assembly may determine;
" ( c ) t h a t the General Officers of the State shall by
virtue of their offices be members of such convention;
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such convention ;
" ( e ) for the submission to the people, for their ratification and adoption, of any constitution or amendments proposed by such convention; and
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" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote of
a majority of the electors voting upon the question of
such ratification and adoption?"
This brief is submitted by leave of Court by the undersigned amid curiae in opposition to the legislative power and
authority of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island to call a convention to revise or amend the Constitution
of the State.
Counsel regret the undue length of this brief and any apparent lack of coordination in presenting their argument.
Any such defects in form are due to the desire of counsel to
use the time available for preparation in presenting to the
court substantive material rather than in developing a formally finished brief.
HISTORY O F THE QUESTION
Abraham Lincoln is credited with saying t h a t government
in the United States is "of the People, by the People, and for
the People." Lincoln's phrase epitomizes our theory of government, whereby we hold that the sovereign powers of government are in the People; that in the exercise of those powers they may organize and establish whatever form of government they desire; and t h a t once a government is established, it should exercise its powers for the benefit of the
People.
Of course, it is obvious that no matter how thoroughly we
may believe that the powers of government are in the People,
the People must necessarily delegate certain of those powers
to the government which they a t any particular time establish. History records that in the evolution of government
in a variety of civilizations many forms of government have
been developed, not the least of which is constitutional government. In 12 Corpus Juris at p. 12 we read:
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"A constitution may be defined as that fundamental
law of a state which contains the principles on which
government is founded, regulates the division of sovereign powers, and directs to what persons each of
these powers is to be intrusted and the manner of its
exercise."
The same authority points out that there may be written
or unwritten constitutions. The latter is the result of gradual growth, changing by accretions rather than by any systematic method. Such were the constitutions of Athens and
Rome, and such is the constitution of England today. In
Freeman's Growth of English Constitution at p. 122 the author says:
"The code of our unwritten constitution has, like
all other English things, grown up bit by bit, and for
the most part silently and without any acknowledged
author."
On the other hand, written constitutions are those which
exist in definite written form and are promulgated at a particular time. They are usually prepared by a specially constituted authority which is generally known in the United
States as a constitutional convention, made up of delegates
thereto elected by the people.
Text writers agree that a constitutional convention is peculiarly an American institution. I t arose from the necessity
for organized governments to replace the charter governments which were terminated by the Declaration of Independence in all the colonies except Rhode Island and Connecticut. In organizing such new governments the conventions acted in the most practical manner demanded by local
conditions. They were irregular in organization, indefinite
as to functions, and in all cases except one the constitutions
drafted were promulgated by the conventions without submission to the people. See Jameson Const. Conv. (4th ed.)
Sec. 131-158.
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In Rhode Island, however, no such convention was held.
Instead we find that on May 4, 1776 the General Assembly
repealed an act of allegiance to Great Britain and the government continued under the charter of 1663. Thereafter on
J u l y 18, 1776 the General Assembly approved the Declaration of Independence, and changed the name of the colony
to "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations." The
people did not dispute this action of the General Assembly
but clearly acquiesced in a government under the provisions
of the Royal Charter of 1663. Thus did sovereignty
pass
from the English Crown to the People. The explanation usually given is that the provisions of the charter were particularly liberal in the matters of self-government, thus making
it unnecessary to restate established principles of government
in order to perpetuate the political and civil rights of the
people. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a new government actually came into existence with sovereignty in the
People.
Subsequent to the adoption of the Federal Constitution,
agitation arose for the drafting of a constitution for Rhode
Island. This agitation was due partly to the fact that under
the charter suffrage was limited to landholders and partly
to the fact t h a t the centers of population were dissatisfied
with their representation in the General Assembly. This agitation continued for half a century and finally culminated in
the adoption of a constitution framed by a constitutional convention in 1842. For a more detailed account of this movement see Appendix A.
Since the charter contained no provision for amendment
and since the adoption of a new constitution involved the institution of a new government, it was generally conceded
that a constitutional convention was a proper method of procedure. Thus in June, 1842 the General Assembly passed an
act whereby the People of the several towns and of the City
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of Providence, "qualified to vote as hereinafter provided, are
hereby requested * * * to choose delegates as they will be
severally entitled to according to the provisions of this act,
to attend a Convention * * * to frame a new Constitution
for this State, either in whole or in part, with full powers
for t h a t purpose." The act is otherwise similar to those of
1824, 1834 and 1841, with additional provisions for the extension of the suffrage. A convention organized pursuant to this
act and framed a constitution, which was submitted to and
adopted by the people in November, 1842, the government
thereunder going into effect in May, 1843. However, it is
significant to note that under Article X I I I of the new constitution amendments were to be proposed by the legislature
and then submitted to the people. The method of amendment by a constitutional convention was ignored as was
every other possible method of amendment. Article X I I I
reads as follows:
"OF

AMENDMENTS

The general assembly may propose amendments to
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the
members elected to each house. Such propositions for
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of
state, with the names of all the members who shall have
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions
shall be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or
notices by them issued, for warning the next annual
town and ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall
read said propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with the names of all the representatives and
senators who shall have voted thereon, with the yeas
and nays, before the election of senators and representatives shall be had. If a majority of all the members elected to each house, at said annual meeting, shall
approve any proposition thus made, the same shall be
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published and submitted to the electors in the mode
provided in the act of approval; and if then approved
by three-fifths of the electors of the state present and
voting thereon in town and ward meetings, it shall become a part of the constitution of the state."
From a perusal of Appendix A it will be noted that in 1821
and 1822 the General Assembly submitted the question
whether it was expedient to provide for the election of delegates to a convention. In 1824, 1834, 1841 and 1842 the
General Assembly requested the election of delegates to a
convention and provided for the organization of the convention. At the May Session, 1853 the proponents of a constitutional convention secured the passage of an act, whereby "The people of this State are hereby invited and requested
to give in their ballots * * * in relation to the Convention
hereinafter provided for". Those in favor of a convention
were requested to write "Convention," and those who were
opposed, "No Convention." The act then provides that "the
people are further invited and requested, at the time and
place aforesaid, to elect delegates * * * to meet in Convention
• * * for the purpose of forming a Constitution of government for this State". In October, 1853 a similar act was
passed and the proposition was again rejected by the people
in November, 1853.
From the above it is clear that after the adoption of the
constitution of 1842 the proponents of a constitutional convention believed that under the constitution the people
must first express a desire for a convention before one could
be called. Hence the electors were requested to vote on that
proposition before proceeding to elect delegates. Moreover
just as before the constitution, the people were not "required" to hold a convention; the legislature merely "invited and requested" the election of delegates to such convention. In other words neither before nor after 1842 did
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the general assembly attempt to legislate with respect to a
constitutional convention.
It will also be noted that the acts of 1853 provided for a
new constitution and not for the amendment of the one then
existing. Apparently it was conceded that amendment was
possible only in the manner prescribed by Article X I I I .
This view is confirmed by the fact that in 1881 a bill was introduced into the general assembly to amend Article X I I I ,
so that the assembly would have the authority to call constitutional conventions to revise, alter or amend the constitution. It was submitted to the electors in 1882 but was
rejected.
The proponents of the convention method then sought to
determine whether a convention to frame a new constitution
could be called by the legislature. In 1883 the state senate
passed a resolution requesting the judges of the Supreme
Court to give their opinion on (1) the legal competency of
the general assembly to call upon the electors to elect members to a constitutional convention to frame a new constitution and (2) the legal competency of the general assembly
to submit to the electors the question whether the electors
would call such convention, and if the majority were willing,
whether the general assembly was legally competent to provide by law for the holding of such convention and for the
submission of the new constitution to the electors. It should
be noted that no question was raised as to the procedure to
be followed in amending the constitution. In a celebrated
opinion rendered March 30. 1883 the judges unanimously
answered the questions in the negative.
The opinion of 1883 gave rise to a thorough discussion of
the legal questions involved by the foremost lawyers of
Rhode Island, led on the one hand by Chief Justice Thomas
Durfee and on the other hand by ex-Chief Justice Charles
S. Bradley. From that time until the present day the issues

254
involved have been the subject of political agitation, despite
the fact that the constitution of 1842 has been amended fourteen times in the manner prescribed by the constitution and
without the use of a constitutional convention.
STATEMENT OF POSITION
In arguing that the court should answer in the negative
the question submitted by the governor, the position of the
undersigned may be stated as follows:
As set forth in the Declaration of Independence, it is selfevident that all men are endowed with certain unalienable
rights and
"That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed; that whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government * * * ."
Also everyone will subscribe to the statement of George
Washington incorporated into Section 1 of Article I of our
State Constitution that
"the basis of our political systems is the right of the
people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
However, it is our contention that the right thus declared
both by the Declaration of Independence and by the State
Constitution is not a right derived from the government
established by the constitution, but a right which exists independent of the constitution. In other words, it is a right
of the people to make changes in their government without
the authority of the government. In short, it is nothing
more or less than the right of revolution as set forth in the
Declaration of Independence. This right of revolution may
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be exercised peacefully or by force of arms. A constitutional
convention is an example of the former, while the American
Revolutionary W a r is an example of the latter. In neither
case, however, is the alteration or change in government
brought about by the authority of the existing government,
which can neither consent thereto nor acquiesce therein. As
George Washington once said:
"The very idea of the power and the right of the
people to establish government presupposes the duty of
every individual to obey the established government."
Hence, the governor's inquiry should be answered in the
negative.
The governor, legislature and courts of this state are
sworn to uphold the constitution of the State of Rhode Island; that is, they are sworn to uphold the existing government. Accordingly, they violate their oath of office whenever they initiate, promote or participate in any act of the
people not authorized by the existing constitution of government which is intended to alter that constitution of government. Their sworn obligation demands support of the existing government and the refusal to participate in any movement that is revolutionary. The matter is expressed in
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions at pp. 233-6 as follows:
"The right of revolution stands not upon the letter
of any law, but upon the necessity of self preservation,
and is just as perfect in the single man or in the petty
state as in the most numerous and powerful empire in
the world. This right, the founders of our system
were careful to preserve not as a right under, but, when
necessity demands its exercise, over our constitutions
state and Federal. . . . The second class of documents
consists in the bill of rights of a large number of our
constitutions, containing broad general assertions of
the right of the people to alter or abolish their form of
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government, at any time, and in such a manner as they
may deem expedient. The peculiarity of these documents is, that they seem to assert the right in question
as a legal right; at least, they furnish a plausible argument for those who are willing to have it believed that
the right is a legal one; when in fact it is a revolutionary right. The framers of those constitutions generally inserted in them provisions for their own amendment. Had nothing further been said, it might have
been inferred that no other mode of securing needed
changes was under any circumstances to be pursued,
but that prescribed in those instruments. Such however was not the intention of the framers. They
meant to leave to the people, besides, the great right
of revolution, formally and solemnly asserted in the
Declaration of Independence. They therefore affirmed
it to be a right of the people to alter or abolish their
constitutions in any manner whatever, that is, first,
legally, in the mode pointed out in their constitutions,
or by the customary law of the land, and secondly,
illegally, that is, for sufficient causes, by revolutionary
force." [Italics partially ours]
So far as the use of a constitutional convention to revise
or amend our state constitution is concerned, the question
before this court is whether such means of altering the constitution is authorized by the constitution. Our position is,
as stated by Jameson, above, that the method of amending
the constitution prescribed by Article X I I I is exclusive of
every other method to revise or amend the same constitutionally. Any other method is revolutionary. In other
words, the mere fact that under Section 1 of Article I the
framers of our constitution recognized the revolutionary
right of the people to make and alter their constitutions is
not a delegation of the power to do so under the authority of
the constitution itself.
I t should be noted further that the Declaration of Independence states that the powers of government are derived
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"from the consent of the governed." In other words, when
the people establish a government they consent to be governed by the provisions of its constitution, and as declared
by Section I of Article I of our constitution, "the constitution
which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon
all." In other words, by adopting the existing constitution
and by incorporating therein a specific provision for Its
amendment, the people have consented to be bound by such
provisions as long as such constitution continues to exist as
a constitution of government. In this connection see Cooley,
Const. Limitations (7th) p. 56, where the author says:
"The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs
all legitimate authority. The people of the Union
created a national constitution, and conferred upon it
powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and the
people of each State created a State government, to exercise the remaining powers of sovereignty so far as
they were disposed to allow them to be exercised at all.
By the constitution which they establish, they not only
tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their oven
hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor
the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to
take action in opposition to this fundamental
law."
[Italics ours]
I t is submitted, therefore, that the fundamental question
before the court is whether a constitutional convention may
be employed as a means of revising or amending the constitution under authority contained in the constitution itself.
If such convention is not so authorized, it is obvious that no
member of the existing government can constitutionally
have any p a r t whatsoever in the calling, organization or deliberations of such a convention. In fact, it is their sworn
duty to oppose it. Thus Cooley says at p. 892:
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"Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several
departments, they have not thereby divested themselves
of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands,
so f a r as they have thought it needful to do so, a power
to control the governments they create, and the three
departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed, or abolished by them. But
this control and direction must be exercised in the
legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of
the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be
of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the constitution, or which,
consistently with the constitution, have been prescribed
and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be
made to interfere with the regular working of the
agencies of government at any other time or in any
other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional
or statutory, it would be revolutionary
in
character, and must be resisted and repressed by the
officers who, for the time being, represent
legitimate
government[Italics
ours]
We believe that constitutional history both within and
without Rhode Island fully supports our major contention.
Furthermore, the same support is found in the opinions and
judicial utterances of the courts. However, we would point
out to the court that the constitutions of only seven states
provide for advisory opinions by the court to the legislative
and executive departments of government, so t h a t it is difficult to find instances where the constitutionality of a constitutional convention has been raised prior to the calling of
the convention.
The general situation revealed by the authorities is that
constitutional conventions have been called and held and
that a new constitution has been drafted and promulgated
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or adopted before the question has been brought before a
proper judicial tribunal. Accordingly, by the time the court
has been called upon to act in the matter or express an
opinion, the changes in government brought about by the
new constitution of government are an accomplished political fact, and the court expressing an opinion is existing under the new or amended government and sworn to uphold it
or is in some other manner compelled to accept the political
situation as it then exists. A classic example of a peaceful
revolution is the transition of our national government from
that under the Articles of Confederation to that under our
Federal Constitution. In this connection see Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. (U. S.) 1.
We believe, however, that it can definitely be said without contradiction t h a t there exists no judicial decision to the
effect that a constitutional convention can be called by a constitutional legislature, unless the constitution of the particular state involved specifically provides for that method of
amendment. The expression of any court to the contrary is
purely dictum. On the other hand, in addition to the opinion
of the judges contained in 14 R. I. 649 we would refer the
court to the case of
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 553. 116 X. E. 921 (1917),
which is a judicial decision to the effect that the general legislative power conferred upon the General Assembly by the
Indiana Constitution does not authorize the General Assembly to call a constitutional convention without first securing
authority from the people. This case arose upon a bill for an
injunction against certain state officials prohibiting them
from doing any act as required by an act of the legislature
calling a constitutional convention for the purpose of revising the constitution. I t will be observed, therefore, that the
question came before the court before any action had been
taken pursuant to the act of the legislature and the court,
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acting under the existing constitution, had no alternative
than to grant the injunction.
I t should also be noted that in connection with our constitutional history, the original constitutional conventions
were irregularly called and held because of the necessities of
the situation incident to the Declaration of Independence.
The only practical method open to the people for setting up
a new government was through some kind of representative
assembly. They had long been accustomed to representative
government and were not shocked by having a representative
assembly meet and create new constitutions of government.
It is not surprising, however, that in creating new constitutions, provisions were incorporated in some of them and
finally in all for their future amendment, since it was obvious that some means other than revolution should be provided whenever a change should be desired.
But it should be remembered that by incorporating a particular method of amendment in their constitutions, the people tied their hands with respect to employing constitutionally any other method of amendment. Thus by adopting the
method prescribed by Article X I I I the people of Rhode Island chose to ignore all methods, including a constitutional
convention, and agreed to be bound by the method prescribed. In this connection the views of Thomas W. Dorr,
Rhode Island's foremost champion of a convention, are enlightening. In Burke's Report at p. 863 he is reported as
saying:
"Where there is a mode of amendment prescribed by
the constitution of a State, it ought to be followed."
However, the argument is sometimes made that despite
the provisions of Article X I I I , the legislature is given the
power to call a constitutional convention, because it was one
of the powers exercised by the General Assembly under the
charter government and was delegated to our present gen-
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eral assembly under the provisions of Sec. 10 of Article IV
of the constitution, which reads as follows:
"Sec. 10. The general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless
prohibited in this constitution."
The short answer to such argument is that by providing a
specific method of amending the constitution under Article
X I I I , the framers of our constitution prohibited the use of
any other method under any general delegation of power
contained in Sec. 10 of Article IV. In this connection see
Taylor d- Co. vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324.
Of course, it may be argued that even if the right of the
People to hold a constitutional convention is extra-constitutional, the legislature has the power as a representative of
the people to call such convention. The answer to such argument is that in so acting the legislature acts extra-constitutionally as an agent of the people in doing an extra-constitutional act. Such act is in no sense an exercise of the legislative power given to the general assembly under the constitution but is entirely independent thereof.
When a legislature acts extra-constitutionally it steps
from the legislative field into the political field, and by committing an unconstitutional act, it does so at the risk of
misinterpreting the will of the people. Thus can the action
of the General Assembly and of the people under the charter of 1663 be explained. I t must be conceded that the government under the charter was definitely a constitutional
government, which was required to observe the organization
of government and the rights protected thereby as set forth
in the charter and certain other documents which are to be
found in the Digest of 1798, such as the Declaration of Independence and the so-called Bill of Rights passed by the General Assembly in 1798. (See Appendix A.) Although the
General Assembly recognized the fact that the adoption of
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a new constitution meant the abolition of the existing government, nevertheless, in view of the fact that no method of
bringing about amendments to the existing government was
prescribed, and in view of the public demand for some orderly and peaceful method of bringing about a change of
government, the General Assembly relied upon political
judgment in utilizing existing governmental machinery for
organizing a constitutional convention. In so doing, it ran
the risk of being repudiated by the freemen, and as a matter
of fact no convention was successful until 1842. But even
under the necessities of the situation, the General Assembly
deemed it politically wise to go no further than to "request"
or "invite" the freemen or the people to choose delegates. In
so doing, they merely gave the people the opportunity to exercise a political right which they had apart from the existing constitution or government, and to that extent they
acted merely as an agency of their constituents. There was
no attempt to legislate or to compel the holding of a convention and no exercise of legislative power.
I t is our contention that there is no necessity for the legislature to act extra-constitutionally in order to give the
people an opportunity to amend the constitution in a manner other than that prescribed in Article X I I I , since that
method is ample for effecting any amendment desired by the
people. In fact since 1842 eighteen such amendments have
been adopted. In other words, the degree of necessity for
such action which existed under the charter government does
not exist under the present constitutional government.
Furthermore, even if there is a demand for a new constitution, such new constitution can be obtained under the provisions of Article X I I I , and in fact such method was attempted in 1898 and 1899, when a new constitution drafted
by a legislative commission was submitted to the people and
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rejected. As pointed out by the opinion of the judges in
14 R. I. 649, such new constitution is no more than an
amendment of the old, since it cannot create a different
form of government but must conform to the requirements
of the Constitution of the United States by providing for a
Republican form of government.
However, if the court sees fit to disregard such broad and
fundamental reasoning and decides to construe narrowly the
word "amendments" in Article X I I I and comes to the conclusion that a constitutional convention is proper for the
framing of a "new" constitution, it is submitted that the legislature, relying upon its political judgment and in the commission of an extra-constitutional act, should proceed no
further than did the legislature in 1853, when it submitted
to the electors (1) the question whether they desired a convention to frame a new constitution and (2) a "request" to
choose delegates for such convention. In so doing the legislature will not be acting in the exercise of legislative power
but will merely be volunteer agents assisting their principals
in an orderly, extra-constitutional manner to exercise a
sovereign power to change their government. In other words,
although the legislature has no constitutional power to render such service to the people, it may conclude that it is
politically expedient to do so. However, with questions of
political expediency this court is not concerned and it must
confine itself to expressing the opinion that if such action
is taken by the legislature it will be unconstitutional.
The situation is perhaps better stated by the court in the
case of Bennett vs. Jackson, supra.
"The Legislature has no inherent rights. Its powers
are derived from the Constitution, and hence, where
some action of the legislative body, which action is outside of the particular field fixed by the Constitution and
is not strictly legislative within the meaning of section
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1, art. 4, supra, is sought to be justified, a warrant for
the same must be found somewhere; if not in the Constitution, then directly from the people, who, by the
terms of section 1, art. 1, of the Bill of Rights, have
retained the right to amend or change their form of
government. The right of the people in this regard is
supreme, subject, however, to the condition that no new
form of a Constitution can be established on the ruins
of the old without some action on the part of the representatives of the old, indicating their acquiescence
therein; and, the General Assembly being the closest
representative of the old, its approval must be obtained
by some affirmative act. This is the only orderly way
that could be conceived. The question then arises:
How may these, the people and the Legislature, get together on this proposition? If no positive rule is provided by the fundamental law of the state, then, if a
custom has prevailed for a sufficient length of years
so that it is said to be fully established, that rule or
custom must prevail.
"It seems to be an almost universal custom in all of
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself does
not provide for the calling of a constitutional
convention, to ascertain first the will of the people and procure
from them a commission to call such a convention, before the Legislature proceeds to do so. The people being the repository of the right to alter or reform its
government, its will and wishes must be consulted before the Legislature can proceed to call a convention.
6 R. C. L. § 17, p. 27; Hoar, Constitution Conventions,
p. 68 (1917)."
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A R G U M E N T

I. THE RHODE ISLAND CONSTITUTION CAN BE
LEGALLY REVISED OR AMENDED ONLY AS ALLOWED IN ARTICLE XIII.
This was the unanimous opinion of the Justices of the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island in answer to a request of
the Senate in 1883.
In Re Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649.
This opinion has stood uncontradicted and uncriticized by
our Court for fifty-two years. On two occasions it has received implied approval.
State vs. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 (1886).
H i g g i n s vs. Tax Assessors of Pawtucket,
(1905).

27 R. I. 401

I n the latter opinion, rendered by a Court upon which there
were none of the Judges sitting a t the time of the original
opinion, the Court, referring to the opinion of 1883, s t a t e d :
"There it was held t h a t the specified method of
amending the Constitution was the only lawful method;
and it is difficult to imagine a reason f o r selecting one
method out of several possible ones, if all the others
are still to remain legal and available."
The opinion of 1883 speaks for itself, and the acquiescence
of the highest Court of the State in t h a t opinion over the
long period of years which has ensued, cannot be lightly
disregarded. In the realm of Constitutions, long established usage, conforming to the dicta of a Court of last
resort, creates a strong presumption of constitutionality.
When the usage of a people and the language of their highest Court concur for half a century, the Court itself must
pause before lightly considering the enunciation of a different doctrine. This is the more t r u e because it is a Constitution and not a mere statute or other ordinary instru-
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ment which is being construed. In Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations (8th) at p. 123, the author says:
"A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments
is that they are to receive an invarying interpretation
and that their practical construction is to be uniform.
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at
one time and another at some subsequent time when
the circumstances may have so changed as to make a
different rule in the case seem desirable."
See also
South Carolina vs. United States, 199 U. S. 437.
In a recent opinion of this Court, the decision was given
and the Court then enunciated dicta covering a much wider
field than the decision and at much greater length. Brereton vs. Board of Canvassers, 55 R. I. (1935). This pronouncement attempted to cover and lay down the law in
regard to the marking of ballots at elections. If this opinion should stand for fifty years and no cases of any kind
were brought to the Court within the field covered by the
dicta, and subsequent Courts should, in several instances
cite the dicta with approval, it is submitted t h a t a strong
implication would arise that the dicta was law.
Since this is, however, the identical question asked the
Court in 1883, it seems proper to let that opinion and its
language speak for itself and to brief the argument in favor
of the conclusion there reached in the same fashion as if
this were a question which the Court were approaching anew
and upon which all pertinent arguments were desired. With
this in mind, such argument will be taken up step by step.

1. The Constitution itself clearly specifies ARTICLE XIII
as the method for its alteration or revision.
When the meaning of any instrument is desired, the
method of approach is always first to consider the instrument itself. In the world of hieroglyphics the pictures
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themselves are considered. In a written instrument the
first recourse is always to the words themselves and, if their
meaning is clear, no further search is necessary. This is a
rule of common sense which has become embodied in the
legal phrase that if the meaning of the instrument can be
gathered from its own four corners, no outside construction
is necessary. In Cooley on Constitutional Limitations
(8th), pp. 123, 124, the author continues:
"The object of construction, as applied to a written
Constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people
in adopting it. In the case of all written laws, it is the
intent of the language that is to be enforced. But this
intent is to be found in the instrument itself."
And, as will be seen from the quotation above cited, it is
accepted law t h a t a Constitution shall be construed in the
same method as applied to statutes and other written instruments. See
Knight vs. Shelton, 134 Fed. 423.
Shepard vs. Little Rock, 35 S. W. 2nd 261 (Ark.).
Hoffman vs. Warden, 2 Fed. Supp. 353.
12 C. J . 699, and cases cited.
An examination of the instrument itself should, therefore,
first be made to find its true intent.
Downes vs. Midwell, 182 U. S. 244.
Old Wayne Mutual Life Association vs. McDonough,
204 U. S. 8.
When this is done, it will be found that there is a specific
Article entitled, "Of Amendments," consisting of Article
X I I I and reading as follows:—
" O F AMENDMENTS

"The general assembly may propose amendments to
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the
members elected to each house. Such propositions for
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of
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state, with the names of all the members who shall have
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions shall
be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or notices by
them issued, for warning the next annual town and
ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall read said
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with
the names of all the representatives and senators who
shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before
the election of senators and representatives shall be
had. If a majority of all the members elected to each
house, at said annual meeting, shall approve any proposition thus made, the same shall be published and submitted to the electors in the mode provided in the act
of approval; and if then approved by three-fifths of the
electors of the state present and voting thereon in town
and ward meetings, it shall become a part of the constitution of the state."
Here is an express method laid down for proposal and
adoption of amendments to the Constitution. By its very
title it is the place to which one would look for provisions
in this regard. Nowhere else in the Constitution is there
any expressed method of amendment or revision mentioned.
In only two other places is there language which might
even remotely bear upon the subject.
Article I, Section 1, reads as follows:
"Section 1. In the words of the F a t h e r of his Country, we declare that 'the basis of our political systems
is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that the constitution
which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit
and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon a l l . ' "
This seems clearly to be a declaration of right and not a
grant of power to the Legislature or any other branch of
the government. Clearly, there is no method of amendment
or revision therein set forth.
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Article IV, Sec. 10, reads as follows:
"The general assembly shall continue to exercise the
powers they have heretofore exercised unless prohibited
in this constitution."
This is a grant, but only a general grant, and there is certainly no express provision for amendment or revision
therein contained.
It is to be noted that in no part of the Constitution is
there any mention of a convention of any kind for any purpose.
I t is submitted t h a t the Constitution itself thus clearly
specifies Article X I I I as the method for any change to be
made in the instrument. Since this is clear, the result
should be accepted and there should be great reluctance in
allowing a different conclusion to be reached by implication.
There is a heavy burden upon those seeking to arrive at a
conclusion inconsistent with the words of the instrument
itself, and at variance with their natural meaning. With
this method of approach in mind, it is proper to consider
the instrument in the light of secondary rules of construction.

2. The sole, express method for change specified in ARTICLE XIII prevents the strained fabrication of other
methods by implication.
I t is a universally accepted method of construction that
the expression of one method of doing a thing prohibits the
raising of other methods by implication. The basis of this
rule is that expressed intention is stronger than any implication and hence an express, indicated method will be taken
as mandatory as against possible different implications. I t
purports to attach more significance to what is said than
to what is left unsaid. This rule of construction is sometimes expressed in the Latin maxim:
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
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This is, however, more than a mere Latin maxim: it is a
method of construction of universal application which has
grown up from the experience of mankind in considering
the essentials to ascertaining the intent of an instrument.
This rule of construction, like other commonly accepted
rules, applies to constitutions as well as to statutes and
other instruments. See
12 C. J . 699 and cases cited above.
The application of this rule of construction in the instant
problem is, of course, obvious. An attempt is made to raise
by implication provision for a Constitutional Convention.
One school of thought attempts to seek this result by raising
the implication from the language of Article I, Section 1.
A second school of thought seeks to reach the same result
by fulsome implication from Article IV, Sec. 10. A third
would imply the legal formation of such a Convention from
fundamental principles of natural law. I t is not important
at this point to consider the strength or weakness of these
implications, but only to call attention to the fact that they
are all implications.
They, therefore, fall under the prohibition of the rule of construction above stated, that, being
implications, they give way to the intention of the instrument as contained in an expressed provision. It follows
that Article X I I I contains the only method for change in
the Constitution.
This result, achieved by use of the well-established principles of construction, is also just as clearly and conclusively
reached if a general construction of the whole instrument
is attempted, with the object of ascertaining its true intent.
Since there is no other specific method set forth in the Constitution, the only method known to American political institutions to achieve an amendment or revision would be
that of a Constitutional Convention. In the absence of any
specific method of calling such a Convention, it would pre-
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sumably be done through the medium of the Legislature
providing for a vote of the people as to whether such a Convention should be established.
Such a Convention, once in session, could make a whole
new Constitution. The time which might elapse from the
first step taken by the Legislature to the calling of such a
Convention and the actual adoption of an entirely new Constitution might be quite short. In any case, it might be f a r
short of the time set forth in Article X I I I as necessary before taking action, namely, the time necessary for vote by
two General Assemblies and the submission of the proposed
amendment to the people. But it seems clear that Article
X I I I provides for such delay in order that adequate consideration may be given to any proposed amendment to the
Constitution. Is it conceivable that the intent of the instrument is t h a t there should be ample time for a consideration of a single amendment but that the whole instrument
might be radically changed or scrapped without such consideration? It is no answer to such argument that a Constitutional Convention is for the very purpose of deliberating
upon fundamental changes in Constitutions and, therefore,
an adequate safeguard. While a Constitutional Convention
might result in ample deliberation and full consideration
by the people of the proposals of the Convention, there is
no assurance of such result. The apathy of the people to
measures which are to them of vital importance often endures for a short period of time, but such apathy does not
continue in "all of the people all of the time." As time
goes on, they become more conscious of the affairs of State.
I t is for this reason t h a t there is no adequate substitute for
the time element embraced in Article X I I I .
A second consideration is just as important. It was apparently recognized by our ancestors that a minority opinion
needs protection and t h a t it may be advisable, under certain
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circumstances, that that minority be guaranteed certain
rights and given such a guaranty t h a t they may be deprived
of those rights only by a vote of more than a bare majority
at a given election. The philosophy of a 3/5 vote required
under Article X I I I is just such. I t may even be based
upon the thought that, considering the number who vote, a
3/5 plurality is no more t h a n an indication of the majority
sentiment of the people. If such a vote is deemed necessary
in order to make a minor change in the Constitution, what
justification is there for disregarding this clear provision
and setting up a method of change which will allow a complete revision without such safeguards?
These conclusions, apart from a careful study of the instrument itself, are made more striking by a consideration
of what was in the minds of the members of the Convention
of 1842 when the Constitution was adopted. Constitutional
Conventions were not unknown to them. The United States
Constitution had been framed in the most celebrated Convention then or since known to history. Rhode Island had
ratified the Federal Constitution by such a Convention
elected by the people. Of the Constitutions existing in
other States of the Union in 1842 many contained specific
provisions for Constitutional Conventions. Such assemblies were, therefore, not unknown to those who drafted our
Constitution at that time. If the safeguards of a Constitutional Convention had been considered adequate and that
method had been desired to be made available to us, provision could have been made in the Constitution. With
amendment or revision by use of a Convention or by the
method set forth in Article X I I I as possibilities, those who
framed the Constitution chose the latter method with the
safeguards which it included.
Not only were there Constitutions then extant containing
such provisions, but the question of Conventions, with its
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various ramifications, had been at the very heart of the
Dorr agitation, which had led to actual armed insurrection.
The question had been agitated and almost fought over for
years. Within a year two Conventions had been held, the
People's Convention and the Land Owners' Convention;
and twice ballots had been cast on the adoption of the instruments thus drafted. Never, perhaps, in the history of
the world, did a Convention ever meet which was better
acquainted with the possibilities of Constitutional Conventions than that which drafted our present Constitution in
1842. Not one of its members, for one instant, could have
been unmindful of the other Conventions within the space
of a few months. In this frame of mind, they drafted the
Constitution and made no reference whatever to the use of
Conventions as a method of altering the fundamental law.
I t needs no use of Latin or stereotyped rules of construction, however valuable, to conclude that the makers of the
present Constitution, knowing full well the meaning of Constitutional Conventions, decided to set up, not that method,
but another method, of effecting such changes. Judge
Jameson may make a plausible assault on the Latin and
the rule, but it is submitted that the realities are against
him. See
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, p. 605.
If a homely example may be pardoned upon such a solemn
question, it is submitted that the situation is similar to that
of the draftsman of a Will under the Rhode Island statute
which, as then worded, provided that children would take
as if by intestacy unless the omission of a bequest to them
appeared to be intentional. Under these circumstances, a
widow's Will concisely contained only the following:
"Having in mind my son William. I give everything
to my son John."
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It, is submitted that the intent of the Convention of 1842
was, because of the above mentioned circumstances, much
clearer than that of Daniel Webster when he reported to
the Massachusetts Convention of 1820, as Chairman of the
Committee on the subject of provisions for amendment to
be written into the Constitution. The report as made and
finally adopted provided that amendments might be adopted
by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses of the Legislature, and a
majority vote of the people. In the course of debate on
the subject, Webster stated:
" I t occurred to that committee that, with the experience that we had had of the Constitution, there was
little probability, after the amendments which should
now be adopted, there would ever be any occasion for
great changes. No revision of its general principles
would be necessary, and the alterations which should be
called for by a change of circumstances would be limited
and specific. It was therefore the opinion of the committee that no provision for the revision of the whole
Constitution was expedient, and the only question was
in what manner it should be provided that particular
amendments might be obtained." Deb. Mass. Conv.
1820, pp. 413-414.
I t is submitted that Webster and the Massachusetts Convention did not intend that a Constitutional Convention could
be called under the adopted Constitution. (Jameson on
Constitutional Conventions, p. 613.) The assertion of
Jameson that such is not its meaning is not at all convincing. And if that was the intention of the Massachusetts
Convention, the same philosophy may have led to the conclusion of the Rhode Island Convention of twenty-two years
later. The fact that Massachusetts later changed its Constitution by a Convention is beside the point, since the
legality of such procedure was not raised prior to its becoming a fait accompli.

The Constitution does not make a Convention impossible;
it merely makes a Convention illegal unless it is brought
about in the only method possible in accordance with the
terms of the instrument. If it is desired that provision be
made for a Convention, all that is necessary is to amend
Article X I I I in accordance with its terms, so as to allow a
Convention to be set up for the purpose of revising the Constitution. A provision permitting a Convention would
seem to be a typical amendment to the present Constitution
and, when once adopted, a Convention could then be called
in accordance with its terms. This is legal and orderly
procedure. I t was accepted procedure even prior to the
opinion of 1883. In 1882, in accordance with the provisions
of Article X I I I , there had passed the second successive General Assembly a provision to amend t h a t Article itself so as
to allow the use of Conventions to revise the Constitution.
See
Acts and Resolves, May 1882, p. 7.
This was submitted to the people and rejected by a vote of
4.393 to 5,121. This recent usage was before the Court
when it rendered its opinion and might have been cited as
confirming usage, if the Court had felt any need of further
buttressing its reasons.
If there were no method of amending the present Constitution, it is arguable that there would be, of necessity, a
power to call a Convention and revise or amend the Constitution. Likewise, if the method of amending the present
Constitution was such as practically to preclude amendments of any kind, it might be interpreted as being, in effect,
a negation of amendment, and an argument could be made
that the right of revision existed and could, perhaps, be exercised otherwise. This argument, however, is not available
in regard to the Rhode Island Constitution, which has been
amended on fourteen occasions by the adoption of eighteen
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separate Articles, in such manner that the amendments to
the Constitution are, in length, equal to approximately threefourths of the Constitution.
If it seems advisable to revise the whole Constitution,
that can be accomplished under the present provisions. Let
a Commission d r a f t a new Constitution, submit it to the
Legislature for proposal, and later to the people for adoption, under the provisions of Article X I I I . This procedure
was actually followed in 1898 and the proposed Constitution
was rejected by the vote of the people. Again in 1915, the
same procedure was followed, except that on this occasion
the proposals were not passed by the General Assembly. It,
therefore, cannot be argued that there is not abundant provision not only for amendment of separate Articles, but for
the entire revision of our present fundamental instrument
of government within clearly legal and orderly procedure.

3. The arguments in support of the contention that the
constitution permits amendment or revision by a constitutional convention are unsound.
Against the conclusions set forth above, arguments have
been made with several different theories as their basis. The
fact that the opposition is based upon several theories in
itself indicates a lack of clear demarcation as to the reasons for the conclusion, and, as pointed out below, includes
also a certain inconsistency in argument among those who
seek the same conclusion. This suggests the possibility
that the opposition is motivated by a desire to seek reasons
to support a desired result rather than by the attempt to
consider the facts and draw such deductions from them
as will achieve the proper conclusion. I t seems proper,
therefore, to consider in brief the varying theories of the
opposition.

279
A.

Article
power

I, Section
to revise

1, contains
the constitution

no grant
by a

of
con-

vention.

This involves the first school of thought among the opposition, namely, that this section, in and of itself, is a grant
of such power, but it seems at once upon reading this section that it is a general declaration of principles rather
than a grant of power. So general are its terms that this
conclusion is inevitable. Furthermore, the word "alter" is
clearly synonymous with the word "amend," as contained
in Article X I I I and hence, so far as "altering" or "amending" are concerned, there would seem to be no question
that this section is merely a general declaration, the
method for the carrying out of which is contained in the
subsequent Article. The word "make" would, under
ordinary circumstances, refer to the initial construction,
namely, the adoption of the original instrument. In that
context, the declaration is, of course, literally true. On the
other hand, if the phrase "make and alter" is considered
together, having in mind a general revision or a specific
amendment, clearly the whole phrase relates only to the
type of thing possible under Article X I I I , as set forth above.
The power intended to be granted or set up under this
Section is, however, more clearly seen when consideration
is given to the action of the Convention of 1842 at the time
the Constitution was adopted. A motion was made to
amend this section by inserting in place of it the following:
"All political power and sovereignty are originally
vested in, or, of right, belong to the people. All free
governments are founded in their authority and are
established for the greatest good of the whole number.
The people have, therefore, an inalienable and indefeasible right, in their original sovereign and unlimited
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capacity, to ordain and institute government, and, in
the same capacity, to alter, reform or totally change the
same whenever their safety or happiness requires."
There was immediate opposition to this amendment and it
was rejected. I t will be seen at a glance that an argument could be made that this proposed amendment was attempting to set up in the people themselves a certain right
which it was claimed could not be delegated. Even then,
the existence of such a right in its conflict with Article X I I I
would have been doubtful. By the ordinary canons of construction, however, the fact that a provision more clearly
implying the existence of such a right was rejected, leads
to the conclusion that those who were framing our present
Constitution had no intention of setting up such a provision.
In that original Convention, on the contrary, there was
apparently a desire to let it appear in the fundamental instrument that sovereignty was in the people and that the
voice sounded by the agencies of government was always
the voice of the people. With this in mind they turned to
the words of Washington in his Farewell Address and
quoted them in Article I, Section 1. In choosing these
words, they must, of course, have had reference to the context in which they appeared in the Farewell Address and
were undoubtedly familiar with the thought in the mind
of the Father of his Country when he used these phrases.
Because one striking sentence might have appeared in
that oration would hardly have led the convention of free
citizens to adopt and quote that sentence when they were
entirely out of sympathy with its context and the thought
of its writer. I t is, therefore, important to see the theme
upon which Washington was discoursing and the context
in which these words were used. Reference to the whole
paragraph in which these words appear and the two succeeding paragraphs will disclose without question what the
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first President had in mind. He had been the head of a
government founded upon revolution. That government
had succeeded to a marked extent. There still were, however, dissents within it. There still was fear of violent opposition to the central authority. Washington knew these
facts. He knew that Revolution had been used to establish
their institutions. He was not, however, delivering an
eulogy of that method. He was not commemorating that
event. On the contrary, he was struck with the sober
thought that while such means were occasionally necessary
and advisable, the danger to a free government once established was in the use on subsequent occasions of the same
means. With this in mind, he uttered the words quoted in
our Constitution and then went on specifically to warn
against departure from orderly principles.
"All obstructions to the execution of the Laws, all
combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with (the real) design to direct, control,
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action
of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this
fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency . . ."
*

*

*

"Toward the preservation of your Government and
the permanency of your present happy state, it is
requisite, not only t h a t you steadily discountenance irregular opposition to its acknowledged authority, but
also t h a t you resist with care (the) spirit of innovation
upon its principles however specious the pretexts. One
method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the
Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy
of the system, (and thus to) undermine what cannot
be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which
you may be invited, remember that time and habit are
at least as necessary to fix the true character of Governments, as of other human institutions—that experience is the surest standard, by which to test the real
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tendency of the existing Constitution of a Country—
that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion exposes to perpetual change from the
endless variety of hypothesis and opinion;
. . . "
I t is submitted that any fair construction of the words
of Article I, Section 1, put back into their original context,
will disclose that they are not intended as the basis for extraordinary assemblies to accomplish fundamental changes
in government. On the contrary, it is clear that the emphasis in the quoted portion of this address is upon the second
part and that the primary purpose in the pronouncement
was to warn the people "that the Constitution which at any
time exists, till changed by an explicit or authentic act of
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
If this be true, where should one look for an "explicit or
authentic act of the whole people"?
Article X I I I is "explicit." Action under Article X I I I
would be "authentic." An adoption of a change under
Article X I I I must be by the "whole people." The "whole
people" are represented in government by the electors. The
"whole people" can set up such procedure as they see fit and
if they desire to provide that changes in their fundamental
law shall be accomplished only by 3/5 vote, no other vote is
an act of the "whole people."
I t is submitted that a fair consideration of Article I,
Section 1, word by word, aside from its original context, its
general meaning as derived from its original context, or its
proper interpretation in the light of the action of the Rhode
Island Convention in rejecting a substitute, can lead only
to the conclusion that it does not provide a method for
amending or revising the Constitution in addition to, and,
in spirit, at variance with, Article X I I I .
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This refers to a second school of thought. Those who hold
this view quote Article I, Section 1, but do not see in it any
specific grant but only general significance. They use it
as a text for the proposition that there is an inherent, inalienable right in the majority to revise the fundamental
instrument of government and that this right cannot be controlled or curbed. From the discussion above, it will be
seen how much solace such a philosophy can draw from the
words of Washington. A consideration of the above will
disclose that any fair-minded person will conclude that it is
the very type of thing of which he was afraid and concerning
which he was advising the new Nation. This leaves this
particular school of thought without Washington as proper
authority.
These people of necessity must go the full distance which
their philosophy dictates. Even if there were a specific
provision in the Constitution whereby a Convention might
be called, they take the attitude that that provision itself is
subject to fundamental, natural law relating to the inherent
rights of a sovereign people said to reside in a majority.
Of course, there is such a right, perhaps more properly
called a power. I t is a power, of course, in the realm of
political science, defined as the "right of revolution." Washington had i t in mind and was warning against it. He
recognized it, but he recognized it quite separately from the
powers contained in the fundamental instrument of government.
The argument in favor of such an inherent, inalienable
sovereignty in the people was that made by Hallett in the
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case of Luther vs. Borden, 1 How. (U. S.) 1, in which he
drew the striking picture of a whole people assembled on
a plain and assumed that sovereign power was present.
Jameson, in striking language, denies this conclusion, even
if it were physically possible for every last citizen so to assemble, and says that under those circumstances such an
assembly
"clearly would have no constitutional or legal right to
pass an ordinance at all. Such an assemblage would
not constitute, in a political sense, The People. The
people of a State is the political body—the corporate
unit—in which are vested, as we have seen, the ultimate
powers of sovereignty; not its inhabitants or population
considered as individuals, . . . except as an organized
body and except when acting by its recognized organs,
the entire population of a State, already constituted,
were it assembled on some vast plain, could not constitutionally pass a law or try an offender."
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 225.
The same authority, after making reference to Hallett's
argument as a "most ingenious defense of anarchial principles," goes on to state that Webster's argument in opposition is the classical enunciation of true principle in this
field. This argument of Webster, Jameson succinctly summarizes in part as follows:
" . . . that not only do the people limit their governments, National and State,—it is another principle,
equally true and important, that they often limit themselves; that they set bounds to their own powers; securing the institutions which they establish against the
sudden impulses of mere majorities; thus, by the F i f t h
Article of the Constitution, Congress, two-thirds of both
Houses concurring, may propose amendments of the
Constitution, or, on application of the Legislatures of
the States, may call a convention—the amendments
proposed, in either case, to be ratified by the Legislatures or Conventions of three-fourths of the States: . . .
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That it is in these modes we are to ascertain the Will
of the American People and that our Constitutions and
Laws know no other mode; that we are not to take the
Will of the People from public meetings, nor from
tumultuous assemblies by which the timid are terrified,
the prudent alarmed, and society disturbed." [Italics
ours]
See also
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 229.
See also Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 56.
The right of a majority to enforce its will, exclusive of the
method provided by the fundamental law, is the right of
revolution. It is that described in the Declaration of Independence as "the right of the people to alter or abolish it
(the government)." That Declaration was a revolutionary
document, and the right so asserted is a right of revolution
whether it be specifically contained in a revolutionary document or be impliedly urged as abiding in a people living
under a Constitution.
And it is no answer to this clear statement of principle
that such Conventions have been held and the governments
set up under them have continued to exist. Revolution may
be peaceful and accepted, but it is, nevertheless, revolution.
Jameson in commenting upon three such Conventions,
strikingly concludes:—
" I t is obvious that to justify such proceedings on
legal grounds would be to take away from the fundamental law, that characteristic quality by which it is
the Law of Laws—the supreme law of the land. If it
is not the supreme law, for all purposes of a Constitution, in the American sense, it might as well be a piece
of blank paper."
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 221,
et

8eq.

There is another principle established by authority and
accepted for its reasoning, which is fundamentally incon-
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sistent with the claimed inherent, inalienable right of the
people to a Convention. This is the principle that where
the Constitution contains a provision for specific method
of amendment, a particular amendment can be adopted only
in that fashion and not by a Convention for the purpose
of that amendment alone. This was the opinion of the
Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
answer to a question of the House of Representatives in
1832.
Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573.
Furthermore, as observed by the Justices of the Massachusetts Court in the opinion cited, it is presumed that it
was not the intention of the Governor to request an opinion
upon natural rights, nor the effect of changes sanctioned by
people in emergencies, but
"We presume, therefore, that the opinion requested
applies to the existing Constitution and laws of the
Commonwealth, and the rights and powers derived from
and under them."
A following of the procedure indicated by the Massachusetts Court is bound to reach the conclusion that under the
Rhode Island Constitution, there is no inherent, inalienable
right in the majority of the people to change that instrument
without regard to the provisions of it.
C.

The

general

grant

of Article

IV

or amend

the

of power

contains

in Section

no power

to

10
revise

Constitution.

Article IV, Sec. 10, reads as follows:
"The general assembly shall continue to exercise the
powers they have heretofore exercised unless prohibited
in this Constitution."
The argument of those who attach significance to this
clause sufficient to achieve their desired result, is that since
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the General Assembly, prior to 1842, had called Constitutional Conventions, that power still resides in them under
the above quoted section. A consideration of the facts will
disclose the weakness of this argument.
Prior to 1842, the General Assembly had extraordinary
powers under the Charter of King Charles, then our Constitution. I t was restricted in few ways. The present Constitution, however, defined and restricted grants of power, and in
order t h a t there might be no question in regard to the power
of the Legislature, there was inserted in Article V, Section
1, entitled, "Of the Legislative Power," at the very beginning
the following:
"This constitution shall be the supreme law of the
state, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void."
The Constitution, therefore, was made supreme and the
legislative power was subject to the Constitution and the results of the Constitution which fair construction might reach.
It is also clear that the grant contained in Section 10,
above quoted, is a general grant and if it contains any power
in regard to Constitutional Conventions, it does so by implication only. If this is so, it has been pointed out above that
an implied grant is negatived by an express grant in another
part of the instrument, when the two are inconsistent.
Section 10, therefore, can only be of importance if, on a
fair construction of the whole Constitution, the power sought
to be implied is present. If, on such construction, the implication of such a power is absent, Section 10 will not help.
This is most clearly seen here in Rhode Island by the case of
Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. That case decided that the judicial power of the State was in the Courts and not in the
Legislature. There was urged against this conclusion the
full force of Section 10, above quoted, and it was conclusively shown t h a t the Legislature not only under the King
Charles Charter, but after its adoption, had exercised judi-
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cial powers. The Rhode Island Court, however, stated that
the Constitution was a new instrument that had to be interpreted to accomplish the object for which it was established,
and that the powers and rights under it would not be unduly
influenced by such a general grant as contained in the cited
section. This was stated clearly at Page 355, where, in reference to the Legislature, it was stated:
"Strong as it is, however, it is, alike with the other
departments of the government, powerless before the
Constitution, and the will of the people, which that instrument expresses."
If the implications of this fundamental instrument made
necessary to accomplish its general intent are strong enough
to overcome any arguable grant under Section 10, how futile
it is to contend that the specific, express method of amendment in Article X I I I is rendered surplusage by this general
grant!
Furthermore, early Rhode Island history discloses that
there was never a willingness to accept too extraordinary
powers as residing wholly in the General Assembly. The
early towns claimed the right to nullify acts of the General
Assembly. A specific town constituting a clear minority of
the people claimed that similar right. With this history and
in the face of the language of Article X I I I , there should be
great hesitation in so construing our fundamental law that
the safeguards against change set up by the people themselves
in specific words were not intended to be more than mere
words, since a quicker accomplishment of the same result by
a smaller vote is at all times possible.

4. The Opinion of the Judges of 1883 is the only direct
authority upon the specific question.
In the field of fundamental law involved in the construction of Constitutions, a local precedent is a f a r greater authority than any observations by foreign Courts. In the gen-
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eral field of law involving general customs, usage, commerce,
etc., the precedents of other Courts are of the greatest importance, even though not controlling. That this is so is demonstrated by the calling of the field the "common law." In
the realm of sovereignty, we are, however, a State unto ourselves, not the national State, it is true, but, nevertheless, a
sovereign State. Under these circumstances, the opinion of
our own Court and the acquiescence in it over a period of
years should be controlling as against any outside precedent.
This does not, however, justify ignoring any possible light to
be derived from outside opinion and, accordingly, the reference should, perhaps, be made to such possible authorities.
The extended argument above in relation to the reasons
for arriving at the indicated conclusion that a constitutional
convention makes it unnecessary again to cover that field by
considering the arguments in text books upon this subject.
It is true that writers upon the general topic have not agreed
with the decision of 1883, but since the authority of such authors is based upon the cogency of their reasoning and has
not the weight of a decision, the only importance to be attached to their attitude is in consideration of the arguments
involved in comparison with the reasonable approach to this
question indicated above.
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions,
Section 570, 574d.
Dodd on The Revision and Amendment of State Conventions, pp. 45, 56.
Hoar on Constitutional Conventions, pp. 43, 48.
In some of the texts and in one or two opinions, there has
been used loose language which would indicate that there
were decisions actually contrary to that of the Rhode Island
Court in 1883. At least, that is what is ordinarily meant
when the term "weight of authority" is used. A careful consideration of the decided cases, however, reveals that in all
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instances the references are merely to dicta and there is not
one case in a Court of last resort actually decided contrary
to the opinion of 1883.
I t must first be observed that the only authority cited in
the opinion of 1883 was the Opinion of the Justices of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 6 Cushing, 573.
Certainly, that decision in general was upon the same subject,
and while attempts have been made technically to cut down
its meaning, a fair consideration of the thought of the Court
is bound to lead to the conclusion that if the Massachusetts
Court had been asked the question put to the Rhode Island
Court in 1883, the answer would have been the same. And
it is no answer to the weight to be attributed to that opinion
to state that thereafter in Massachusetts a constitutional convention was held without a change in the constitution. The
legality of that convention was not raised in the courts, and
after it had once been held and a constitution purported to
have been adopted and officers elected under it, there was no
way to raise the question of its legality.
There are certain cases sometimes cited as being at variance with the opinion of the Rhode Island Court.
Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39.
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59.
Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100.
State vs. Powell, 77 Miss. 543.
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81.
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336.
State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., 137 La. 403.
A consideration of the cases themselves will, of course,
reveal to what extent they have purported to cover the topic
involved in the present question, but just a word by way
of reference to them may not be out of place.
In Wells vs. Bain, supra, the decision was upon the question as to whether the supervision of the balloting relating
to a convention should be by ordinance of the convention or

291
under the general laws passed by the legislature. The Court
did imply the existence of a power to create a constitutional
convention, but in doing so it was considering the language
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which stated that the
people "have a t all times an inalienable and indefeasible
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such
manner as they may think proper." The significance of
this provision is more clearly recognized in the second Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal, supra. In that case, at
Page 70, the Court, speaking of the above provision of the
constitution, stated:—
" I t defines no manner or mode in which the people
shall proceed to exercise their right, but leaves that to
their after choice. Until then it is unknown how they
will proceed, or what powers they will confer on their
delegates."
And again, at Page 72, the Court states:—
"The calling of a Constitutional Convention and the
regulating of its action by law is not forbidden in the
Constitution. It is a conceded manner [italics in
original opinion] through which the people may exercise the right reserved in the Bill of Rights. I t falls,
therefore, within the protection of the Bill of Rights,
as a very manner in which the people may proceed to
amend the Constitution . . . . "
The construction of the right to call a convention under
such a provision is clearly apparent as a possibility, and
the Court so stated. This provision is, of course, f a r different than the provision in Article I, Section 1, of the
Rhode Island Constitution. It is also true, in Wood's Appeal, t h a t the Court openly stated that since the convention
had been held and the new constitution adopted, under
which the Court was holding, there could be no review of its
legality. This appears in the opening sentence where the
Court states:
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"The change made by the people in their political
institutions by the adoption of the proposed Constitution since this decree, forbids an inquiry into the
methods of this case. The question is no longer
judicial . . . "
From that opening point onward, the case is dicta.
In Collier vs. Frierson, supra, the question was as to the
validity of the adoption of a certain amendment to the constitution in view of the fact t h a t it had been omitted from
the Resolution at one of the sessions of the General Assembly. In State vs. Powell, supra, the question was a
similar one in relation to the validity of the adoption of an
amendment. In each of these cases, there is but a single
sentence which bears at all upon the question at issue in
the instant case, and that sentence is wholly unnecessary to
the decision.
In State vs. Dahl, supra, the question was the validity of
a mode of procedure by the General Assembly in relation to
amending the constitution, as to whether a joint Resolution
or an actual legal Act was required. The Court expressly
stated at the end of the opinion t h a t it was not necessary to
pass upon the question as to whether a constitutional convention could be held. I t then went on to state that the
weight of authority and precedent was in favor of such
power, citing "Jameson, Const. Conv., ss 570, 574d; In Re
Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649; Opinion of Justices
of Supreme Court, 6 Cush. 573."
Since Jameson cites no judicial opinions to uphold his
point of view, the North Dakota Court is in the peculiar
position of stating a proposition as law, which is the exact
opposite of that held by the only cited cases.
In Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, the decision involved the
legality of an attempt to submit a new constitution without compliance with the amending clause of the old consti-
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tution. In a long opinion upon this subject, numerous
quotations are made and arguments proposed, but all, with
the exception of the above decision, are dicta.
In State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., supra, some
dictum appears but the case itself apparently involves the
extraordinary decision that p a r t of the very constitution,
under which the Court held, was not effective, although the
constitution had been adopted as a whole. Under these
circumstances, it is not extraordinary that a dissenting
Judge should have stated, in declaring the Court to be without jurisdiction:
"Our authority or jurisdiction
than its source."

cannot

rise

higher

It is submitted that it is extraordinary, indeed, if, as
alleged by certain text book writers, the weight of authority
is against the Rhode Island opinion of 1883, to find that
there are no actual decisions to that effect. Such decisions
would be expected to be in corroboration of the action of
other branches of the government and, therefore, the type
of decision which the Court would not hesitate to give, even
though the question be somewhat political in its nature.
However, there are none such. On the other hand, one
would not expect to find cases on all fours with the Rhode
Island decision. In only a few States are advisory opinions
of the Justices legal, and it is in one of these, Massachusetts,
that there appears the opinion closest to that of the Rhode
Island Court. When a convention, regardless of legality,
is actually being called or in existence, the judicial branch
of the government is always loathe to interfere and entertain jurisdiction. It foresees that the result may ensue
despite its decision and realizes the probable impotency in
what it may decide. W h a t is true at the time is clearer
still after the convention has been held and the new con-
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stitution adopted. The Court then is in this dilemma: It
can decide that it is holding over, deriving its authority
from the old Constitution. In this case, as a Court it has
no executive or legislative branch available to carry out its
decisions, and thus it stands as a mere academic tribunal.
Or it can decide that it is holding under the new constitution; but it then follows that it has taken an oath to uphold that constitution and it does not then lie in its power
to declare as of no effect the sine qua non of its own very
existence.
See
Wood's Appeal, supra.
State vs. American Sugar Refining
Company,
(Dissenting Opinion), supra.
The fact that this is so means that one would expect to find
precedents in action taken which would not, under ordinary
circumstances, bear the scrutiny of judicial inquiry as to
legality under the ordinary processes of decision.
I t is, therefore, submitted, on reason and authority, that
the Rhode Island opinion of 1883 should be followed by the
Court in answering the questions now before it, and the
method of approach is well laid down by Judge Cooley in
Bay City vs. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, a t p. 506:
"Constitutions do not change with the varying tides
of public opinion and desire: the will of the people
therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed
by their own deliberate action, and it cannot be permissible to the Courts that, in order to aid evasions and
circumventions, they shall subject these instruments
. . . to a construction as if they were great public enemies standing in the way of progress, and the duty of
every good citizen was to get around the provisions
whenever practicable and give them a damaging thrust
whenever convenient. They must construe them as the
people did at their adoption, if the means of arriving
at that construction are within their power."
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In 1842 a Constitutional Convention, only too well acquainted with Conventions, chose to omit provision for such
a convention; in 1882 the people of Rhode Island, at the polls,
indicated their opposition to the inclusion in our fundamental law of a provision for such convention; in 1883 our highest Court rendered the opinion that the constitution did not
permit the calling of a convention, and that opinion has been
referred to with approval on two subsequent occasions. The
Rhode Island Constitution in 1935 is the Constitution of
1842, 1882, and 1883, and it is to be hoped t h a t its meaning
remains the same.

II. EVEN IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN CALL A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, IT M U S T
FIRST RECEIVE AUTHORITY TO DO SO BY A
REFERENDUM TO THE PEOPLE.
Assuming t h a t this Court arrives at the conclusion that
the provisions of the present constitution of Rhode Island do
not prevent the calling of a constitutional convention in this
state,—in other words, that the opinion of the justices found
in 14 R. I. 649 is unsound,—there still remains to be answered
the question of how such a convention may be called, how it
may be constituted, the extent of its powers, and the method
of finally adopting the new constitution when drafted. The
next section of the brief will be devoted to a consideration
of the methods of calling such a convention.

1. The Development of the Law of Constitutional Conventions.
The constitutional convention as we know it is of modern
origin, and such conventions are of two classes,—first, constitutional, and second, revolutionary. We will treat only
of the first class. The two conventions most frequently referred to as a starting point are those of 1660 and 1689 in
England, and they were revolutionary. Owing to the liberal
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powers given to Parliament by custom and practice, this system of law, as we know it, has not arisen in that country.
The English system of parliamentary government has no
written constitution or constitutional law in the sense that
we have one.
The constitutional convention was largely a development
from the conditions surrounding the Revolutionary War. It
was the result of the emergency and the growth of the unusual times which surrounded the reconstruction period of
this country during the years following the Revolutionary
War. Too much weight should not be given to the precedents
established prior to the period about 1800. They may be helpful, but the conditions under which they were given must be
carefully considered. From 1800 to the period of the secession movement in the South about 1860, conventions were
with few exceptions called and conducted in the ordinary
way with much regularity. Similarly the constitutional conventions of the period from 1860 to 1870 were in general so
closely connected with the secession movement and the Civil
War, either directly, as in the case of seceding states, or indirectly, as the result of the reconstruction period following
the war, that they are of little value as precedents. The period from about 1870 to 1895 or 1900 was a period when the
calling of conventions continued to gain both as to the method of their calling and as to their operations in a logical and
established manner. (Dodd, The Revision and Amendment
of State Constitutions, Chap. 2.) In Ellingham vs. Dye, 178
Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, the Court said:
"The formation of Constitutions in the Revolutionary
and reconstruction periods of our history and instances
* * which involved the validity of a Constitution submitted to the people by the territorial Legislature, and
by which a state government was instituted, are obviously distinguishable."
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And in Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59, the Court said:
"No argument for the implied power of absolute sovereignty in a convention can be drawn from revolutionary times when necessity begets a new government."
The methods of calling constitutional conventions and the
powers of the people over their conventions have now taken
definite form and are quite well established. Even after giving effect to the above comments, however, there is still left
an amount of material for consideration upon the questions
before us. This material may be divided into two general
classes, which in order of their importance as legal authorities are,—
(1) Decisions of courts in contested cases;
(2) Opinion and comments of individual jurists, text
writers and others.

2. The Sovereignty of the People.
Underlying every decision of a court, every opinion of a
justice, and every comment by a jurist, must be the fundamental idea of all constitutional law, so well stated in Article I, Section 1 of the present Constitution of Rhode Island,
that
"the basis of our political systems is the right of the
people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the
whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
I t would be impossible, however, as Jameson says, for the
people in a modern state to gather as one unit "on one great
plain" and, if they so gathered, there to transact the affairs
of state. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitation
(8th Ed., 1927), Vol. I, page 81, says:
"The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs
all legitimate authority."
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and again at page 82:
" * * * as a practical effect, the sovereignty is
vested in those persons who are permitted by the constitution of the state to exercise the electors' franchise."
J u s t as "necessity, the mother of invention," has brought
into existence the idea of representative government and
the legislature as an expression thereof, so too in any government of law, necessity requires that some legally constituted body, presumably the legislature, take the initial
step of submitting to the people the question of such a convention. The authorities are practically unanimous, however, in holding such submission of the question to be the
limit of the power of the then existing legislature, this principle arising from the fundamental fact t h a t the making of
a new constitution is a sovereign act of the sovereign people
and the necessary corollary that the legislature acts not
under powers previously delegated to it by the people, but
as an agent of necessity.
The present legislature of Rhode Island derives its authority from the Constitution of 1842, which provides no
mechanism for a constitutional change by the convention
method. In the absence thereof (assuming t h a t the calling
of a convention is nevertheless permissible) the legislature
can act only in the submission of the question to the people
of the calling of a convention, by force of necessity, as the
only body reasonably available to provide a mechanism for
ascertaining the wishes of the sovereign people from whom
it and the whole existing government draw their powers.
When acting in this capacity as an agent of the sovereign
people it acts not under the rights conferred upon it by
the Constitution of the state, but as the voluntary agent of
what is sometimes referred to as the fourth department of
our state, namely, the people acting in their sovereign right.
That the sovereignty vests in the people is an accepted fact,
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but from such fact it does not follow that there has been
any delegation of authority to the legislature to initiate proceedings for a constitutional convention. Even after a convention is organized, the extent of its authority may be
questioned.
During the early part of the nineteenth century it was
sometimes argued that the people's sovereignty was delegated
to the convention and that it and it alone had the full rights
of the people when once called into being, but this theory is
no longer accepted. Dodd says in his work at page 77:
"The theory of conventional sovereignty has been
advanced by speakers for several conventions beginning
with that in New York in 1821, but no convention
seems, however, to have attempted to act upon the
theory or even to have endorsed it."
Probably the best summary of the powers of a convention
is found in Dodd, p. 77-80, where he says:
"Under Judge Jameson's theory a constitutional convention called by a vote of the people may be restricted
by simple legislative act so that it may not revise or
propose the revision of any part of the existing constitution which the legislature may forbid it to touch.
The convention is made subordinate to an organ of the
existing government. Judge Jameson proceeded on
the assumption that a constitutional convention must
possess sovereign power—that is, all of the power of
the state—or that it must be strictly subordinate to the
regular legislature. H e could conceive of no middle
ground between these extremes. In attempting to demolish the theory that the convention is sovereign, he
went to the other extreme and really made the legislature the supreme body with respect t o the alteration
of state constitutions, for under his view a convention
may be restrained by a legislature as to what shall be
placed in the constitution, and no alteration can be
made without legislative consent. Judge Jameson
pushed his theory to its logical conclusion and held that
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a convention, even after elected and assembled, might
be dissolved by legislative act, or that the legislature
might prevent the submission of its work to the people. . . . The better view would seem to be that the
convention is a regular organ of the state (although as
a rule called only at long intervals)—neither sovereign
nor subordinate to the legislature, but independent
within its proper sphere. Under this view the legislature cannot bind the convention as to what shall be
placed in the convention, or as to the exercise of its
proper duties."
Judge Jameson would deny all sovereign power to the convention and make it an instrument of the legislature, but
Dodd says of his work (p. 77, note 10),—
"Judge Jameson's work may be said to have been
written to disprove the theory that a convention has
sovereign power, and under these conditions the theory
assumed in his mind a much more important position
than it ever attained in fact."
We may conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of sovereign
power is today that it rests in the people and extends to the
convention or other agency of the people only so f a r as is expressly and clearly given by them. In no sense does it rest
in the legislature, except so f a r as it is voluntarily assumed
by the legislature as a voluntary agent to initiate the submission of the question of the calling of a convention to the
people and in the calling of a convention when so approved.
See Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 583; 116 N. E. 921, where
the court says:
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all of
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself
does not provide for the calling of a constitutional convention, to ascertain first the will of the people and procure from them a commission to call such a convention,
before the Legislature proceeds to do so. The people
being the repository of the right to alter or reform its
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government, its will and wishes must be consulted before the Legislature can proceed to call a convention."
[Italics ours]
The several questions asked by the Governor lead to four
considerations,— (1) the method of calling a convention,
(2) the power and duties of a convention, (3) the manner
of ratification and adoption of the constitutional form, and
(4) the method of electing delegates.

3. The Method of Calling a Convention.
This question submitted is a very important one. No
method of calling a convention is designated in the Constitution. The prevailing doctrine today, as we shall show, is
unquestionably that the question should be first submitted to
the people by an act of the legislature, allowing them to
vote whether in favor of or against such a convention. In
the past there have been instances where the convention has
been called by the legislature. I t is doubtful if that ever
has been the prevailing view, and it certainly is not today.
Both the opinions of the court and of the accepted writers
sustain this view. The reasons for this view are easy to see.
The refraining or revising of a constitution is a matter of
great importance and far-reaching in its effect. I t affects
the fundamental law of the state. It of necessity requires
deliberation, mature thought and careful consideration.
The great danger is that one political party, swept into
power by temporary issues, may hastily rush through a Constitution and thereby solidify themselves in office. I t takes
time to submit to the people the question of calling a convention. I t saves time if the legislature can by its own act eliminate this step and proceed directly to the election of delegates. But delay is desirable, as it leads to deliberation,
thought and study, which are of the essence of wise constitution framing.
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If the legislature passes upon this question of calling a
convention, the electors are deprived of their opportunity to
pass upon the question and aroused public opinion is unable
to express its views as to the scope and purpose of the convention. The voter will be called upon to designate delegates and not to express his views upon the question of holding a convention or upon the scope of its works. If he votes
for delegates, he votes for his representatives who may be
limited in their deliberation by legislative act. If he refrains
from voting, delegates will still be elected. Obviously such
a convention when chosen is the creature of the legislature.
Under this method there is no expression of the people's
wishes. Their sovereign rights are ignored.
I t is true that if the legislature submits the work of a
convention to the people for their approval or rejection they
may accept or reject it, but that is not a full exercise of the
sovereign power of the people. I t is their right to initiate
and direct the framing as well as to accept a Constitution.
The delays caused by the submission of these questions to
the people are highly desirable. The calling of a convention
is not frequent and is little understood. Intelligent action
on the part of the electorate requires time. One of the
greatest evils is too much speed in the inception of the
movement for a new Constitution. For these reasons the
principle of the legislature submitting the question of calling a constitutional convention to popular vote has become
well established.
These thoughts were concisely and ably stated by Judge
Cooley in an article in the American Law Review (1889),
page 311, when that eminent constitutional writer said:
"A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of
temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion.
It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield
to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the
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people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency.
* * * Changes in government are to be feared unless
the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: 'All great
mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and
a worse.'"
They have been well stated in State, ex rel. Wineman vs.
Dahl, 6 N. D. 81-85 (1896), where the court says:
"Nor can it be said that it is an empty form to leave
to popular vote the grave question whether the people
shall assemble in convention, and revise their fundamental law."
and on page 87:
"But while the power resides in the legislature, and
that body only, to call a constitutional convention, it is
obvious that the agents of the people, who have not been
selected on that particular issue, should not take upon
themselves the responsibility of burdening the people
with the expense of such a movement, without first submitting to them the question whether they desire such a
convention to be called. The argument against the
taking of the initiative by the legislature in such cases,
without first ascertaining public sentiment on the question, is so strong, and lies so plainly on the surface,
that in many states the Constitution, in terms, requires
the submission of the proposition to popular vote, and
a majority vote in its favor, before the legislature can
legally summon the people to meet in convention to revise their organic law." [Italics ours]
In Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, 17, col. 1,
2, (1912), the court says:
" I t must be remembered that the Constitution is the
people's enactment. No proposed change can become
effective unless they will it so through the compelling
force of need of it and desire for it. We have not
heard the voice of the people raised in a demand for a
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new Constitution. And so we doubt if there is reason
for applying the doctrine of construction ab inconvenienti to the existing Constitution to hurry to the
people organic change which they had not called for.
That the Constitution may need an amendment may be
true. But there has never been a time when the people
might not, if they pleased and if they had believed it
necessary, have made any change desired in the orderly
ways provided. That they have not done so, and that
the General Assembly may believe good will follow by
deviating from slow and orderly processes, will not
justify a construction of the Constitution which does
violence to its intent and express provisions."
Probably the weightiest opinion on this particular point
is that of Chancellor Kent written in 1820. The New York
State Assembly had undertaken to call a convention without first submitting the question of the call to the people as
a whole. The opinion in question was included in the statement of objections made by the council of revision in returning the bill to the Assembly. See Jameson pp. 669-671:
"The council therefore think it the most wise and
safe course, and most accordant with the performance
of the great trust committed to the representative powers under the constitution, that the question of a general revision of it should be submitted to the people
in the first instance, to determine whether a convention
ought to be convened. The declared sense of the American people throughout the United States on this very
point cannot but be received with great respect and
reverence; and it appears to be the almost universal
will, expressed in their constitutional charters, that conventions to alter the constitution shall not be called at
the instance of the legislature without the previous
sanction of the people, by whom these constitutions
were ordained."
An equally straightforward statement by the New York
Supreme Court made in connection with the New York con-
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vention of 1894 is found in the Journals of the 69th New
York Assembly, p. 919; approved by committee headed by
Elihu Root in report to New York Convention of 1894, Rev.
Record Vol. 1, p. 258-60-270:
"The legislature is not supreme. It is only one of the
instruments of that absolute sovereignty which resides
in the whole body of the people. Like other departments of the government it acts under a delegation of
powers; and cannot rightfully go beyond the limits
which have been assigned to it. This delegation of
powers has been made by a fundamental law, which no
one department of the government nor all the departments united, have authority to change. That can only
be done by the people themselves. A power has been
given by the legislature to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which, when approved and ratified by the
people, becomes a part of the fundamental law. But no
power has been delegated to the legislature to call a
convention
to revise the Constitution.
That is a
measure which must come from, and be the act of the
people themselves." [Italics ours]
A still more powerful statement of the principle involved
was adopted at the Mississippi Convention of 1851 (See the
Journals of that Convention, pp. 48-50, and the quotation
therefrom in Hoar, p. 67) :
"That in the opinion of this Convention, without intending to call in question the motives of the members
of the Legislature, by the call of this Convention, the
Legislature, at its last extraordinary session, was unauthorized by the people; and that said act, in peremptorily ordering a Convention of the people of the State,
without first submitting to them the question whether
there should be a Convention or no Convention, was an
unwarranted assumption of power by the Legislature;
at war with the spirit of republican institutions, an encroachment upon the rights of the people and can never
be rightfully invoked as a precedent." [Italics ours]
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Most constitutions expressly require action by the people.
The correctness of the principle of requiring action by the
people before a convention can be called is affirmed not only
by the decisions and opinions cited above, but by the fact
that it is expressly written into the text of thirty-two of our
state Constitutions.
Dodd in his work, Revision and Amendments of State
Constitutions (1910), says at page 51:
"The practice of obtaining the popular approval for
a convention may be said to have become almost the
set rule. Thirty-two constitutions require such an expression of approval and even where it has not been
expressly required, such a popular vote has been taken
in a majority of cases in recent years."
Mr. Dodd then summarizes the situation and states at page
53:
"According to what is now the most usual procedure
in the adoption of constitutions there are three popular
votes connected with the matter: (1) The vote of the
people authorizing the convention; (2) Selection by the
people of delegates to the convention; (3) Submission
to the people for their approval of a constitution framed
by the convention."
Mr. Hoar at page 60 reaffirms the statement of Mr. Dodd:
"Thus the practice of obtaining the popular approval
for the calling of a convention may be said to have become almost the settled rule. Thirty-two State constitutions require such a popular expression of approval, and even where it has not been expressly required, such a popular vote has been taken in a majority of cases in recent years."
See also Hoar, p. 68:
"Thus convention calling is not a regular function of
the legislature, and there is a growing tendency towards
a view that the legislature has no power to call a convention without first obtaining permission from the
people."
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The latest authority and in most respects the best is the
case of Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N. E. 921, 923
(1917). In that case an injunction was sought to prevent
a convention which had been called by the legislature without first submitting the question to the people. We again
quote the language of the court, which is the last judicial
utterance which we have been able to find which is in point:
"The Legislature has no inherent rights. Its powers
are derived from the Constitution, and hence, where
some action of the legislative body, which action is
outside of the particular field fixed by the Constitution
and is not strictly legislative within the meaning of
section 1, art. 4. supra, is sought to be justified, a warrant for the same must be found somewhere; if not in
the Constitution, then directly from the people, who,
by the terms of section 1, art. 1, of the Bill of Rights,
have retained the right to amend or change their form
of government. The right of the people in this regard
is supreme, subject, however, to the condition that no
new form of a Constitution can be established on the
ruins of the old without some action on the part of the
representatives of the old. indicating their acquiescence
therein; and, the General Assembly being the closest
representative of the old, its approval must be obtained
by some affirmative act. This is the only orderly way
that could be conceived. The question then arises:
How may these, the people and the Legislature, get together on this proposition? If no positive rule is provided by the fundamental law of the state, then, if a
custom has prevailed for a sufficient length of years so
that it is said to be fully established, that rule or custom must prevail.
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all of
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself
does not provide for the calling of a constitutional convention, to ascertain first the will of the people and
procure from them a commission to call such a convention, before the Legislature proceeds to do so. The peo-
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pie being the repository of the right to alter or reform
its government, its will and wishes must be consulted
before the Legislature can proceed to call a convention.
6 R. C. L. §17, p. 27; Hoar, Constitution Conventions,
p. 68 (1917)."
*

*

*

*

" I t is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the lower court denying injunction be reversed,
with directions to restate its first, third, fourth, and
fifth conclusions of law in conformity with this
opinion."
The dissenting opinion by Lairy, J., was based on other
grounds.
This is probably the latest authority that we have upon
this subject and is a well-considered case. The legislature
cannot create the convention or bring it into being without
a mandate from the people. I t is not within the legislature's
power. Hoar reasons thus, at p. 65:
"A still further consideration is as follows: If it be
the legislature which enacts the convention act and thus
calls the convention into being, then the legislature can
confer on another body (i. e., the convention) a power
(i. e., to propose a constitution) which the legislature
itself does not possess; which is absurd."

4. The Danger in Calling a Convention without a Referendum to the People.
If this first important step is eliminated, the American
system of reforming the constitution is deprived of one of its
most important elements in securing the enlightenment and
education of the people to perform their necessary part in
the adoption of the constitution. Why should it be eliminated? Why the haste? The old government still exists and
functions. There is no demand heard on the p a r t of the people that there should be a new form of government. If it is
done for mere political reasons, if it is done for a mere de-
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sire to perpetuate the reign of those in power, such motives
while inspiring haste furnish the strongest of arguments
why exceptional and unlawful methods should not be resorted to.
Jameson (Const. Con v. §122, p. 110) states the danger
of omitting to submit the question of calling a constitutional
convention to the people, and holds that "public opinion
should have settled upon its necessity." He says:
"A simple resolution or vote [ of the legislature]
would commonly give expression to the general desire,
but were that all, there would be danger that party
spirit might avail itself of majority to call conventions
for partisan purposes.
This danger being far from unreal, doubtless the wiser course would be for the legislature so to act as to forestall it. A check ought to be
found by which the probability of its occurrence would
be reduced to a minimum." [Italics ours]
The author then refers to the expedient adopted in many
states, of submitting the question to the people for their approval or rejection. He refers with full approval to the
language of Chancellor Kent in the report of N. Y. Council
of Revision, where this practice was much commended,
(1821 App. F. 669-71, for full copy) and proceeds (p. I l l ,
referring to the report of this Council upon the principle of
first submitting the question of calling a convention to the
people) :
" * * * , by whom it was declared to be most consonant to the principles of our government and of the
practice of other states. * * * * There can be no doubt
that this decision was a sound one on
constitutional
principles. The intervention of the legislature is necessary to give a legal starting point to a convention, and
to hedge it about by such restraints as shall ensure
obedience to the law; but as a convention ought to be
called only when demanded by the public necessities,
and then to be as nearly as possible the act of the sov-
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ereign body itself, it would seem proper to leave the
matter to the decision of the electoral body, which
stands nearest to the sovereignty, and best represents
its opinion. Such seems to be the prevailing sentiment
in most of the states. * * * " [Italics ours]
Jameson further refers to the danger of hasty action and
says:
§532. "It is obvious that, were the existing government of a state, or any branch of it, invested with the
power, without condition or limit, to call conventions
to change the organic law, there would be cause to
apprehend two dangers; • * * * that our conventions
would become the arenas, and our constitutions the objects as well as the instruments of party conflict. The
right of the people at any time to amend their constitutions must be admitted; but as they can never do this
directly, the necessity becomes apparent of checks, to
render it probable that a movement to that end has
been sanctioned by them, and that it has been done upon
due consideration. * * * , the checks must be such as
will obviate the evils' above enumerated, resulting from
haste, excess, and partisan zeal, in legislation." [Italics
ours]
The author then advocates the submission of the question
of holding a constitutional convention to a vote of the people, saying,
"and, therefore, whenever the electors have assented to
the call of a convention, its necessity or eminent propriety may be considered to be beyond doubt."
James Madison also appreciated the dangers of hasty
action in the alteration and changing of constitutions,
(Madison's Works, Vol. 1, p. 177).
Jameson uses appropriate, if strong, language when he
describes the all too prevalent conditions which surround the
calling of constitutional conventions. They are very true today in all parts of this country. This state could hardly
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be called an exception. The danger is that the convention
will be called for partisan purposes; that it will become an
"arena" and the objects of the convention become the "instruments of party conflict." Our courts and writers have
been well aware of this situation, and have endeavored to
lessen the evils by removing the conventions as f a r as possible "from haste, excess and partisan zeal" as a result of
legislation.
The court cannot be unaware that the tide of party passion is running high in this state at the present time. Words
are spoken and action is contemplated, if not actually undertaken, which would not be thought of in normal times.
Therefore, the exercise of those safeguards which constitutional law has so carefully and wisely provided, should in a
time like this, as in all other times, be applied to the present
situation. Chief among these safeguards is the one which
we have just considered with such care and at such length.

5. Rhode Island Precedents.
The only precedents which have arisen under the Rhode
Island Constitution are in full accord with the foregoing
authorities. After Rhode Island had adopted its Constitution of 1842, the question of holding a constitutional convention in Rhode Island was submitted to the people twice in
1853. Rhode Island then had a Constitution and a General
Assembly elected under that Constitution. When seeking a
constitutional convention the General Assembly did not attempt to call a convention itself, but sought the express
approval of the electors.
At the May Session 1853 of the General Assembly (Acts
and Resolves. May Session 1853) an act was passed by which
"The people of this State # * # are # * # invited
and requested to give in their ballots upon the question
of holding a Convention. And if it shall appear that a
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majority * * * are in favor of said Convention, it shall
be deemed and taken to be the will of the people of this
State, that a Convention shall meet * * *
And the people were further requested to elect delegates to
such Convention in the event that it should be approved by
the electors. A majority of the votes were against the holding of a convention, but delegates were elected.
Again at the October Session 1853 of the General Assembly (Acts and Resolves, October Session 1853) an act was
passed in similar language to that of the May Session inviting and requesting the people to vote upon the question of a
convention.
The two acts are important.
(1) They show full recognition of the right of the people
of this state, and not the General Assembly, to pass upon the
question of calling a convention. This was in full conformity with the well-established practice of that time.
(2) The General Assembly acted as the voluntary agent
of the people. Notice the humble and deferential language
when it "invited and requested" the "people" to give in their
ballots. There is no command, no threat of punishment if
action is not taken. The Assembly declares that if a majority votes favorably "it will be deemed and taken to be the
toill of the people of this State" that a convention be held.
Not the decree or edict of the Assembly but the will of the
"people" must determine. All this is recognized by the
Assembly, and it speaks as the agent, the servant, and to the
people, its master.
These two acts are drawn in the most correct and approved manner.
All undertakings to revise or amend the charter after 1853
were in accordance with Article X I I I of the Constitution.
The use of earlier instances in which constitutional conventions were called and the General Assembly did not sub-
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mit the question of holding a convention to a vote of the
people as an argument that the legislature may itself call a
convention is not "warranted. Conventions were called in
this state by the General Assembly in 1824, 1834, 1841 and
1842. But at that time the state was acting under its old
charter granted by Charles II. These charters placed almost controlling authority in the General Assembly in the
government of the colony. The judiciary and other branches
of the government were treated as subordinate to it. Constitutional government did not exist at those times as we now
understand that branch of our law. Therefore, the calling
of the conventions under the charter can not fairly be cited
as arguments in favor of the power or practice of legislatures themselves to call constitutional conventions without
first submitting the question to the people.
In support of this view we will refer to the comments of
Mr. Dodd (at p. 37) written when discussing the adoption of
a Constitution by Vermont in 1786. He says:
"A Vermont author [Thomas Crittenden] has well
expressed what were at that time popular views in this
state as to the relation between the constitution and the
legislature: 'In all governments which had previously
existed, the legislature, the law-making power, had been
sovereign, absolute and uncontrollable.' Judge Blackstone says: l e g i s l a t i o n is the greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another,
wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of law, that
it be made by the supreme power. Sovereignty and
legislation are, indeed, convertible terms. One cannot
subsist without the other.' This constitutional law, this
omnipotence of the legislature, the colonists brought
with them from the mother country, as they brought
with them the common law."
This idea that the legislature was supreme, which was
brought to this country from England together with the
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English common law, and which placed the judiciary and
executive departments below the legislative department, was
the English law. So long as we were acting under the charter, until 1842, it was the law in this state. The theory of
the superiority of the legislature to the judiciary was not
exploded until the case of Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. Dodd
says that it continued until a late date in Pennsylvania and
Vermont.
However, it should be noted that in the acts of 1824, 1834,
1841 and 1842 the General Assembly went no further than to
provide that the freemen or people "are hereby requested to
choose" delegates to a convention for the purpose of framing a new constitution. Such an act is clearly not legislation; the people may observe or disregard the same at
pleasure; and it amounts to no more than utilizing the existing machinery of government for the purpose of giving the
people an opportunity to act in an orderly and reasonable
manner to bring about changes, when no other manner is
prescribed.
Accordingly, we submit that precedents both before and
after 1842 are in accord with the argument heretofore advanced ; to wit, that even if the General Assembly can call a
constitutional convention, it must first receive authority to
do so by a referendum to the people.

III. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IS
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO
POWER TO PROVIDE THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE STATE SHALL BY VIRTUE OF
THEIR OFFICES BE MEMBERS OF SUCH CONVENTION.
This question, it is clear in our opinion, should be answered in the negative. The thought behind subdivision (c)
of the Governor's question evidently is that the General As-
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sembly might by act or resolution make the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, General Treasurer and
Attorney General ex-officio members of the convention, with
the same powers as other delegates.
This proposal is absolutely foreign to the whole theory of
constitution making as emanating from the people. I t suggests a usurpation of power by the General Assembly for
which no authority worthy of consideration can be found
either in practice or in theory. It may be that in the confusion which attended the setting up of new constitutions immediately after the Revolution, a few instances may be found
where the legislature went so far as to designate delegates
to a constitutional convention. Such instances are not surprising, considering the pressure of the times. Men could
not in the midst of a revolution halt to consider all the precedents. In emergencies they resorted to emergency measures. Moreover, the colonial legislatures, operating under
charters from the Crown, had exercised much broader powers than they possess under American theories of constitutional law.
The only court opinion which we have found in which such
action was even referred to is t h a t of Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa.
St. 39, where, though the legality of such action was in no
way involved, the court in its passing remarks throws grave
doubt upon the wisdom of the legislature selecting any of
the members of the convention. Aside from the Revolutionary examples, and with the possible exception of Wells vs.
Bain, it seems never to have occurred to anyone that it was
not a necessary element of every constitutional convention
that the delegates thereto be elected by the people themselves. I t is difficult to argue otherwise. The convention
should be so constituted as to obtain the greatest freedom
from partisan bias and control and the maximum capacity
for deliberate, dispassionate, unbiased action to be applied
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to the important duty of making a constitution. The members thereof should be the choice of the whole people and
not of a partisan body such as the legislature.
Beyond those functions assumed by it under the necessity
of the occasion in respect to those acts which the people cannot perform themselves, the legislature may act, but in no
other respect. But in so acting, the legislature is not exercising legislative power under the constitution. Furthermore,
there is no necessity for the legislature to elect all or any of
the delegates as the voluntary agent of the people. All the
delegates can easily be elected by the people.
I t seems clear that that department of government—the
executive department—which is most likely to be affected by
the action of the convention as to its powers, election of its
officers, and in other respects, should not have its active representatives ex-officio or otherwise as members of that important body. If they wish to impress their views upon the
convention they should appear before the convention, not
in it.
These five general officers should not be made members
of the convention by legislative act any more than high members of the judiciary or the members of the legislative
branch. If it can be done in one instance it can be done with
equal propriety in the other,—and so on, without limit. The
views of all of these three departments of the state, each of
which may be so vitally affected by the action of the convention, can be effectively presented to the convention by their
representatives appearing before the convention without being represented by membership within it.
If the General Assembly can pass an act that the five general officers shall be members of the convention, it can pass
an act that the entire membership of the legislature shall be
members of the convention or perhaps the only members.
If it can designate five members it can designate half or
three-quarters or all of the members. Even the entire Gen-
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eral Assembly could be made a part of the convention. There
is no stopping place once the power is conceded. Consideration of these possibilities goes f a r to show the unsoundness
of the proposition submitted.
There is no inherent power in the legislature to take such
action, nor is there any occasion for the existence or exercise of such power. The lack of precedent goes far to show
this. If it can declare these five general officers members of
the convention, by virtue of their office, it can so constitute
the convention that these five would control the work of the
convention. For example, it could so enact as to give an
equal number of delegates to its own major party and an
equal number to the opposite party but add thereto the five
general officers of the state, ex-officio, as suggested by the
governor's question. Or again, suppose those same general
officers happened to be of the opposite party, would the legislature then feel t h a t it had the power to elect or designate
the holders of these same general offices as members of the
convention? Of course not. Again, each department of the
government is to be affected by the new constitution in its
powers, rights and privileges, and consequently its officials
are highly interested parties in the results of that convention. They are not disinterested and should not be members
and. it is submitted, the General Assembly in the exercise
of its legislative power or in the exercise of any assumed role
of agent of the people has no power to make them members.

IV. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IS
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO
POWER TO CONTROL THE ACTION OR WORK
OF SUCH CONVENTION.
Cooley (p. 87), I I I :
" * # * But no body of representatives, unless especially clothed with power for that purpose by the people

